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Military Tribunals and Constitutionality: Why
International Terrorists Should Be Tried by the UN
David L. Martin t and Megan Landen 1
Although many U.S. officials beliew that foreign ttrrOrists should be tried in
Amuican mili.try n-ibttnals, proceeding with time speci4/ly commissioned
nials will rob difmdants ofbasic legal rights and significantly harm global
perceptions ofthe United States.

A ccording to President Bush, America is fighti ng against "the most evil
.rl.kinds of people" in its war on terrorism.' Because of the extreme threat
terrorists pose to our security, special military tribunals have been commissioned to prosecute non-U.S. citizens accused of terrorist activities. Unlike
international criminal courts, which allow for an open-court process, these
tribunals are dosed to the public. Critics of the administration's legal tacrics
have labeled the special tribunals "kangaroo courts" because due process of
law and widely accepted rules of evidence are absent. 2 But the Bush Administration claims that the extreme danger posed by terrorists warrants the
use of military tribunals, which "would be more efficient [than criminal
courts] and make it easier for prosecutors to convict the guilty."3 The Bush
Administration ignores the lack of legal rights given to defendants in such
trials, focusing rather on the lost opportunity that would result if suspected
1 David L. Martin is a senior from Spring C ity, Utah, and studies political science with an
emphasis in international devdopment. He is also wotking on minots in Russian studies and
business management. David served a mission in Novosibirsk, Russia.
1 Megan Landen is a junior studying psychology and Spanish. She is from Connell, Washingron, and is the oldest of six d1i1dren. Megan just married Joe Landen and plans to be a clinical
psychologist.
1
Arlen Spencer, "The President's Authority," Chicago Daily Latv Bullain, 28 November

2001,6.

' Martin L Haines, "Military Commission Order Made Bush the Initial Prosecutor and
Final Judge: Promise of a Fair Trial Is Impossible with the T.'lking Away of Due Process Rights,
Decent Rules of Evidence, n New jersey Law ]ottrnaL 166 (December 2001): 23.
3 Tom Perrotta, "Press Access to Tribunals Is Debated,n Nnv York Law ]onmal (28 February 2.002): I.
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terrorist operatives were nor tried in military tribunals. For the
Bush Administration, the danger in the new war on terrorism has
escalated to the point that granting internationally recognized
POW rights to captured rank-and-file members of the Taliban is less
important than ensuring a quick conviction. Although many U.S.
officials believe that foreign terrorists should be tried in American
military tribunals instead of by an international body such as the
UN or the ICC, proceeding with these specially commissioned trials will rob defendants of basic legal rights and significantly harm
global perceptions of the United Stat es.
MILITARY TRIBUNAL PROCEDURES

While many of the rules concerning the tribunals have changed
since President Bush first announced their establishment in 200 I ,
sufficient levels of due process for the trials have not yet been provided. Although the tribunals now allow for the accused to be presumed innocent, the regular rules of evidence do not apply. H earsay
and secondhand evidence will be allowed at the trials, and the accused will not be entitled to see evidence brought against them. 4
Although proponents of the tribunal s justify this absence of basic
legal rights by pointing out that the tribunals are for non-U.S. citizens on ly, denying due process to defendants because of their citizenship is an affront to the Constitution and shows a lack of concern for international defendant rights such as revealing to the
accused the evidence against him or her.s
In addition to violations about revealing evidence to the accused, placing limits on who can receive a fair and timely trial directly conflicts with many of the founding principles of this country. The Declaration of Independence states clearly that there are
certain self-evident truths, "that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their C rearor with certain unalienable rights." This

21;

• Marjorie Cohn, "Let U.N. TryTerrorisrs.~ Natilmai Law joumai(xo December 2.001), sec. A.
John Mintz, "U.S. Adds Legal Righr in Tribunals,* l'fTashingto•l Post, 21 March 2002, sec. A, 1.
' Cohn, sec. A, 21.
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includes the right to be presumed innocenr and have due process of
law. In the nineteenth cencury, historian Charles W. Penrose in a
public address made this statement regarding the imporcance of
those founding rights:
In the Declaration of Independence it is laid down that there are
certain rights that cannot be alienated, that are natural, that are inherent, that are not imparted by governments.... An act of any
individual or any government which [sic] infringes upon these
natural rights is wrong in and of itself.6

Regardless of religious affiliation or political sentiment, these
rights, especially the right to a fair trial, must be provided to everyone, even to our enemies. Failing to stand up for the civil rights and
liberties of people in all nations endangers not only the rights of the
minority but also the righ ts of t he majority.
LACK OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW

These specially commissioned military tribunals also deny the
accused a fair trial because they disallow an independent appeals
process. Because the Supreme Court will not have habeas corpus
review power, those convicted of terrorist acts will not be allowed
to appeal the tribunal's decision in an independent court.' This
lack of an independent appeals process in the commissions is stirring up human rights groups. Jamie Fellner, a spokeswoman for
Human Rights Watch, said, "Not to have an independent court of
appeals and then to have the president have the final say undercuts
whatever fairness [the Bush Administration] sought to provide at
the trial level. "•

•Charles W. Penrose, "Latter-day Saint Readings on America and the Constitution,"' in]rest
and Holy Prinripl~s. ed. Rh,iph C. Hancock (Boston: Pearson Custom Publishing. 1998), 52.-55.
• Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., "Shortchanging Due Process,~ Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, 5 December, 5·
'Katharine Q. Seelye, "Rules Set on Afghan War Prosecutions," N~w York Timts, 11 M:trch
2002, <http://nytimes.comhoo2/oJ/2I/politics>, 26 Masch 2002.
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Supporters of the uibunals are anxious for the trials to be held
outside of the United Scates, which would keep control of the
process in the military chain of command. 9 This reticence to have
any control outside of the U.S. military is alarming. Having such
exclusive regulation over these uials causes Americans and the
world co lose confidence in them. Because President Bush also has
final review of the cases, he acts as the initial prosecutor and final
judge, which contributes to the evidence that these tribunals are far
from non-partisan and fair. 10
The Bush Administration's denial of an outside appeals process
indicates chat the commissions are set up for a predetermined outcome. The main disadvantage of having an outside appeals process,
at least from the perspective of che Bush Administration, is that tribunal decisions could be reversed. On the ocher hand, having an appeals process outside of the military chain of command would lend
greater legitimacy to the tribunals. But, for decision makers, the
costs of not punishing guilty terrorists are greater than the costs of
losing legitimacy. This cost-benefit analysis indicates that the commissions are sec up for a predetermined outcome: to avoid the risk
of letting guilty terrorists go free.
Ocher precautions chat have been established co minimize the
possibility of releasing potential terrorists include detaining prisoners indefinitely, even after their acquittal. 11 Prisoners who are found
innocent could remain in U.S . custody for the duration of the War
on Terrorism, which might last several years or more. During that
time, prisoners are denied visitors and kept without criminal
charges or knowledge of how long they will be held. There have already been twenty attempted suicides by the prisoners. 12 Holding
someone after acquittal is a grievous offence that is likely to foster antagonism cowards the U.S. in both our friends and enemies.
• Ibid.
Haines, 13.
"Katharine Q. Seelye, "Penragon Says Acquittals May Not Free: Detainees,~ Nnu York
Times, 22 March 2002, <http://www.nytimes.comhool/OJh:Unationab, 26 March 2002.
11
Martha Mendom, "Guatanamo--Suicide; Lawyers, Families, Human Rights Groups
Seek Answets to Suicide AttemptS," /Usociaud Prr'ss, 4 March 2003 .
10
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In rernational law and precedent suggest that fairness dictates detaining only those prisoners who will be tried in the near future,
thus giving them their legal right to a speedy trial.U The rest of the
prisoners should be released to their home countries.
CoNSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGAl. PRECEDENT

Like the judicial branch, the legislative branch has been left our
of the prosecution of those charged with committing acts of international terrorism. Many in Congress are critical of the executive
branch's attempt to handle this situation alone. They want to be involved in determining the rules for the tribunals. Republican Senate Judiciary Committee member Arlen Specter said, "Sin ce the
Constitution empowers the Congress to establish courts with exclusive jurisdiction over military offenses, some consultation with
leadership would [be] appropriate." 14 He further commented that
the administration is not discussing the commission with any member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This desire to avoid outside
influence indicates that the executive branch has gone too far in this
power-grab. Even during times of extreme crisis, Congress and the
courts have historically played critical roles in establishing the appropriate balance between national security and civil rights.•~
These military cribunals will resemble the special military commissions in which German saboteurs were secretly "executed in relatively rapid order" during the World War II.~<; The commissions
were also used at that rime to convict General Yamashita, a Japanese general who historians now believe was innocent. The conviction of General Yamashita, which rook place in 1946, was the last
time the commisions were used. Military commissions have a history of concentrating more on judicial efficiency, or coming ro a
'' Sedye, "Pentagon Says Acquittals.M
Spencer, 6.
"Ibid.
••Geoffrey Robertson, "Kangaroo Courts Can't Give Justice: We Need an International
Tribunal for Terrorist Suspects," Guardian, 5 December 2001, <http://www.guardi:m.co.ukl
Archive/Article/o,4273·43IJ472.,oo.htmi>, 26 March 2002.
14
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quick verdict, chan on fairness. America has apologized for secret
tribunals in che past and will risk che possibility of reaching hasty
verdicts if it continues co use them to try foreign citizens.
The dearth of legal rights afforded to defendants in these military
tribunals can be seen in many ocher areas. Shockingly, the tribunals include a plan to monitor attorney-client conversations. This measure, as
well as closing the trials to outsiders when necessary, is done "to protect
national security." 17 In addition, al Qaeda and Taliban forces are being
held indefinitely at Guancanamo Bay. They are denied access ro lawyers
and consular officials of their home countries, which are rights promised to POWs as established by the Geneva Convention." The Red
Cross regards these prisoners as POWs, as does much of the international community. U.S. officials, however, refuse prisoners the status
of POW because it would grant them additional rights. In some respects, the prisoners are in political limbo: they are neither POWs nor
convicted terrorists. Their status lies tensely between these two positions. In this current situation, prisoners are deprived of almost every
legal right.
In addition, members of the military tribunals, whom D efense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld will personally select, are unlikely to
be impartial. 19 Secretary Rumsfeld will likely choose tribunal members that favor easy convictions. The concept of hand selecting judges
is foreign co U.S. law, in which judges in civil and criminal cases are
assigned randomly co ensure fairness and impartiality.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Because of che unfairness of the military tribunals proposed by
the Bush Administration, people both in the United Scates and
abroad have clamored for che trials ro be held by the UN. The
''James Gordon Meek, •Ashcroft Assails Adversaries for Aiding Terrorists," Los Angela Daily

foumal, 7 December 1001, 1.
" John Minrz, ·Detainees Case ro Be Taken co OAS Rights Commission," Washingtqn Post,
February 1001, sec. A, 17.
" Ronald C. Smith, "The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Terrorists,~ Chicago Daily
Nctvs Bulletin, l i December 2001, 5·
25
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Nuremberg trials established a precedent of judicial fai mess at the
international level. These trials handed down verdicts against over
185 high-ranking Nazis in thirteen unprecedented and often highly
contentious cases. In the first of these cases, eight judges partici pated, two each from France, England, Russia, and the United
States. During the other twelve cases-all of which were highly disputed-only American judges participated. Having an international
panel gave legitimacy to the first set of trials. That legitimacy was
not present in the orhers. 20 The United Stares would gain legitimacy
by turning over the prisoners co an international criminal court, because international courts are seen as impartial and as protective of
individual rights.
These trials could be carried out in a similar manner to a UN
war crimes tribunal that is prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic, an indicted war criminal charged with genocide and crimes against humanity in Bosnia and Kosovo. Global perceptions of the trial are
positive. Many people have heard of the atrocities that cook place in
the former Yugoslavia and are glad chat Milosevic can come to trial
before an international court.
Recently che Bush Administration agreed to allow some currem
and former U.S. officials Lo testify against Milosevic at his trial in
The Hague, Netherlands. The appearance of American officials at the
tribunal could set an important legal precedent. They would be the
highest-ranking U.S. officials to ever testify before an international
war crimes tribunai.2 1 This lends legitimacy to the international trials
and shows chat the Bush Administration itself is warming up to the
UN war crimes tribunal, which already receives unquestioned support from every other prominent country.
Many people in Europe and the United States have asked that a
UN war crimes tribunal cry foreign terrorists, especially al Qaeda
and Taliban forces. The reasons for such a t rial include guaranteeing
,. Peter H. Maguire, Law and ~r: An Amtrican Story (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000).
" Colum Lynch, " U.S. Offers Help in Milosevich Trial," Washington Post, 21 March 2002,
sec. A. 20.

32

BRIGHAM YoUNG UNIVERSITY PRELAW REviEw

[Vol. 17

fairness, needing to impress upon the world the danger of the radicalism of al Qaeda's philosophy, and exposing Bin Laden and his
lieutenants before they gain martyr status. 21 A UN criminal tribunal would contain many judicial essentials that the military tribunals
lack: due process of law, openness of proceedings, reasonable rules
of evidence, an independent appeals process, the release of acquitted prisoners and chose who will nor stand trial, the right to have
counsel from one's own country, clear and prompt notice of the
charges, and an impartial commission. From this list one can see
the potencial benefits of trying captured al Qaeda and Taliban
forces. Nor only would it bring justice to those who use terrorism
to meet their political agenda, it would do so while mainta ining an
honorable reputation for being fair and impartial, equally affording the rights of humanity to all.
In some respects, ir is not just the al Qaeda and Taliban forces
that are on trial, it is also the United States itself. The United Scares
has often been accused of trying to run a one-man show. Especially
in this war on terrorism, we often ignore the opinions of our dose
European allies, disregarding their advice because of security concerns. How friends and foes will rela te to the United Stares i n the
future, how other countries rry U.S. citizens accused of terrorism,
and how the United States will eventually reduce international terrorism significantly hinge upon whether or not we decide to use
military tribunals to try foreign terrorists.
FuTURE NEGATIVE IMPACT

Relations between America and Europe regarding American
military involvement in European affairs are quire brircle. Many
countries already feel char they have to fight against the increasing
trend toward United States unilateralism. One result of the war on
terrorism has been to "[confirm] that Washington calls the shots;
it has also pushed Europeans to name their differences from the
'· Robertson, •Kangaroo Couns.•
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superpower."2J Any strongly unilateral moves made by America in
the current political scene could result in a rebellion of sorts by the
major European players. By insisting on conducting military tribunals independent from the rest of the world, the United States is
at risk of losing many valuable allies and legitimacy in the eyes of
our European supporters.
Most politicians know that both an ideal policy and an actual
policy exist. They also know that some policies can in reality be
much closer to the ideal. This is the case with military tribunals and
criminal courts. While the crim inal courts may not be devoid of
problems, the problems associated with them are of a lesser evi l, so
to speak, than those associated with the military tribunals. In all
likelihood, the military tribunals estab lished by President Bush will
take place despite cr iticism from both local and foreign sources. It
is crucial that the tribunals are imp lemented as fairly as possible,
giving each accused party due process of law. Even international persons charged with heinous crimes have the right to be presumed innocent, fairly defended, dealt with in a timely manner, and released if no charges are being fil ed. The implementation of such
highly contested rules will affect long-range global perceptions,
international allies, and opinions about the legitimacy of the
United States. The most significant reason behind utilizing international criminal courts was put forth eloquently by Robert E.
Hirshon, president of the American Bar Association: "We continue
to stand firm in our resolve that all involved in the atrocities of
September II be brought to justice. But we need to do it in a way
that respects core American values of due process and fundamental
fairness.'' 24

4 Sherle R. Schwenninger, "Bush's Globalized NATO: As Envisioned by the Administration, It's Unilateralism with a Multilateral Face," Tbt> Nation 273 (December 2001): 27.
"' Robert E. Hirshon, "Our Dury is to Bring Terrorists to Trial the American Way," Cbicago
Daily Law Bulktin, 28 February 2002, 2.

